Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 5 | Issue 5

2-1-1930

Notes on Recent Cases
J. P. Guadnola
Kenneth Konop
William H. Konop
A. J. Barlow

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
J. P. Guadnola, Kenneth Konop, William H. Konop & A. J. Barlow, Notes on Recent Cases, 5 Notre Dame L. Rev. 282 (1930).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol5/iss5/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

Article 5

Notes On Recent Cases
WATERS AND WATER COURSES - Surface Waters - What Are - Obstruction - Rights and

Liabilities - Defendant owns property abutting that
of plaintiffs' and lying at a lower level. Storm and
surface water were accustomed to flow in two natural
and well-defined channels, draining without flowing over
or upon the property of either owner. Defendant constructed an irrigation ditch with earth embankments
within a few feet of plaintiffs' property line. Two
years later the county of Los Angeles graded and paved
Whittier boulevard, which ran above and perpendicular to
Vancouver avenue, about which street the property in question is located. There were constructed a large number of
streets beyond Whittier boulevard and the grading and paving of said streets resulted in the filling up and closing of
the natural drainage channels and water became greatly accelerated and were diverted into Whittier boulevard west
of its natural channel with the result that it flowed to some
extent onto the land of the plaintiffs', and, if not diverted,
across the land of the defendant. Defendant's ditch caused
the water to back up and to overflow plaintiffs' property,
causing considerable damage thereto. Held, the owner of
the dominant estate (plaintiffs here) has a legal and natural
easement in the servient estate (defendant's estate) to discharge surface waters falling or accumulating on his land
over the land of the servient owner in such manner as it
would naturally flow from a higher to a lower level, and the
owner of the lower estate is answerable in damages for any
injury which may be caused to the upper estate by reason
of obstructions which he has placed in the Way of such natural flow, causing it to back up or remain on the land of the
upper owner.-Le Brun et ux. v. Richards (D.C.A., California, 1930), 283 Pac. 323.
Various important questions were developed in the
principal case before the court finally determined the rights
and liabilities of the parties. Waters and water courses involve a multitude of technicalities, and the interpretation
of one term is often the determining factor in a case of
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this nature. First the court must determine whether or not
the water in question may be included within those waters
which are technically known as "surface waters." On this
question it is generally held in California and in most jurisdictions that the term must be confined to waters falling
on the land by precipitation or rising thereon in springs,
and does not include all waters which may be on or moving
across the surface of the land without being collected into
a natural water course. Horton v. Goodenough, 184 Cal.
451, 194 Pac. 34. In its ordinary sense "surface waters"
means water collected on the surface of the ground, Ramsey
v. Ketcham, 73 Ind. App. 200, 127 N. E. 204, having no
defined channel or belonging to a permanent body, but when
such waters reach and become a part of a natural stream
or permanent body like a lake, they lose their character
as surface waters and are governed by a different rule. In
re JudicialDitch No. 9 of Nobles County (1922), 152 Minn.
544, 188 N.W. 321. Where a river overflowed by heavy
rainfall, as it was accustomed to do from time immemorial,
such waters were deemed flood waters and not surface
waters. Gobin v. Piety, 72 Ind. App. 156, 125 N.E. 655.
In some states it is the established doctrine that overflow
water from rivers and streams is surface water. Goll v.
Chicago 4 A. Ry. Co., 271 Mo. 655, 197 S.W. 244; Morton
v. Hines, 112 Wash. 612, 192 Pac. 1016. Generally, if the
waters leave the main channel without returning they become surface waters; if they are still a part of the main
channel or soon return to the main channel they are not
held as such. Distinguish "surface waters" from "overflow
water" in Buchanan v. Seim, 104 Neb. 444, 177 N.W. 751,
where water accumulated in flood season within the drainage area of a natural stream and found an outlet in the ordinary channel of the stream when the flood subsided.
The court in the principal case followed the civil law
rule, in holding that the upper proprietor has an easement
to have water flow naturally from his land and that the
lower proprietor may not obstruct, such natural flow in a
manner that would cause the water to back up on the tenement estate. However, it must be pointed that the rule
is only applicable provided that the flow of the water was
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neither accelerated, diverted, or concentrated by any act
of the dominant tenement. Some of the more cited eases
recently decided where the civil law rule was applied are:
Winchester v. Byers (1929), 196 N. C. 383, 145 S. E.
774; Mobile 4 0. R. Co. v. Red Feather Coal Co., (Ala.,
1929) 119 So. 606; McKiernann v. Grimm (Ohio App.,
1929), 165 N. E. 310; John v. Chicago B. 85 0. R. Co.,
202 Iowa 1282, 211 N. W. 842; Sloss-Sheffield Steel 4-Iron
Co., v. Nance (Ala., 1927), 113 So. 50; Besler v. Greenwood, 202 Iowa 1330, 212 N. W. 120; Vidrine v. Guillory,
3 La App. 462; Higgins v. Spear (Tex. Civ. App., 1926),
283 S.W. 584, (Texas common law rule changed by Acts
34th Leg., 1st called Sess., c. 7) ; Beechley v. Harms (1928),
332 Il. 185, 163 N. E. 387.
Jurisdictions following the common law rule regard
surface waters as a "common enemy" and hold that land
owners may protect their property by diverting the water,
regardless of its effect on the property of others. Consequently, under this rule, the owner of the servient estate
may divert surface waters even though the result is to back
the water up on the dominant estate. Evansville, Mt. C 4
N. Ry. Co. v. Scott, 67 Ind. App. 121, 114 N. E. 649;
Belcastro v. Norris (Mass., 1927), 158 N. E. 535; Daly v.
State (N. Y. Ct. Cl., 1928), 228 N. Y. S. 738, 132 Misc.
Rep. 92; Tucker v. Hagan (Mo. App., 1928), 300 S. W.
301; however, the injury to others must not be the result
of diversion in a reckless manner, Adair Drainage Dist. v.
Quincy, 0. 4 K. C. R. Co., 280 Mo. 244, 217 S. W. 70;
Kilts v. State, 184 N. Y. S. 107, 113 Misc. Rep. 112.
Some states have held that the rights of both upper and
lower owners are protected under the rule of law that permits one to use and enjoy his land and dispose of hostile
surface waters thereupon, subject to the application of the
principle "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas." Henderson
v. Hines, 48 N. D. 152, 183 N. W. 531; Raleigh Ct. Corp.
v. Faucett, 140 Va. 126, 124 S. E. 433. It was held in the
case of Olney Springs DrainageDist. v. Auckland (1928),
83 Colo. 510, 267 Pac. 605, that a landowner cannot drain
water onto a neighbor's land without the consent of the
latter.
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Under the common law rule when the owner of the
dominant tenement, in grading, or building, etc., causes surface water to flow upon the servient tenement, the damage
that may be caused thereby is damnum absque injuria,but
the lower tenant may protect himself by any reasonable
means. Gannon v. Hargadon, 92 Mass. 106. In regard to
reasonable means of fending of surface water, it has been
held that if two ways are equally efficacious, and neither require unreasonably greater expense than the other, and
one only will damage adjoining property, the other must
be adopted. Toler v. Bear Creek Drainage Dist. (1926),
141 Miss. 851, 106 So. 88. And under the common law
rule the dominant proprietor may not collect surface water
and conduct it by artificial means to discharge it on the
servient estate, and in increased volume. Tucker v. Hagan
(Mo. App., 1928), 300 S. W. 801. Such use as this is adverse and therefore it has been held that the upper tenant
may thereby acquire an easement after the statutory period,
White v. Chapin, 96 Mass. 516, but without some adverse
use the common law does not recognize the existence of an
easement or servitude upon the servient estate.
It seems that the civil law rule is better suited to the
needs of rural districts, inasmuch as it recognizes the right
of the upper tenant to have the continuance of the normal
drainage and the duty of the lower tenant to receive this
normal flow of water. Whereas, the common law rule in
regard to surface waters is found more adaptable in urban
centers, particularly since it provides for no restrictions,
in this connection, in the erection of buildings. However,
under the qualifications of the civil law either rule permits
the promotion of good husbandry.

J. P. GuADNOLA.
DIVORCE-Provision in statute requiring plaintiff
in divorce action to file affidavit of residence sworn to before clerk held mandatory and jurisdictional. KLPiFER v.
KLEPFER (Ind.). 169 N.E. 478.
Plaintiff in his action for a divorce against his wife,
in the complaint charged her with cruel and inhuman treatment. With his complaint, he filed an affidavit to which he
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had sworn before a notary public, stating therein his occupation, and his residence. The question in the case is whether
or not this affidavit is in conformance with Section 1097 of
Burn's Ann. Statutes 1926 which reads as follows: "the
plaintiff shall, with his petition, file with the clerk of the
court an affidavit, subscribed and sworn to by himself, in
which he shall state the length of time he has been a resident
of the state, and stating particularly the place, town, city,
or township in which he has resided for the last two years
past and stating his occupation, which shall be sworn to
before the clerk of the court in which said complaint is filed."
Because the plaintiff in this suit failed to follow the terms
of the statute and filed an affidavit sworn before a notary,
rather than one sworn to before the clerk of the court that
was to try the case; the Supreme Court of Indiana reversed
the decision of the lower court and held that there was no.
divorce granted.
The court held that this provision as regards the affidavit is mandatory and without such affidavit the court try-.
ing the case has no jurisdiction of the cause. Indiana cases
affirming this doctrine are: Smith v. Smith, 185 Ind. 75;
Wills v. Wills, 176 Ind. 631; Canan v. Canan, 88 Ind. App.
623; Crowell v. Crowell, 82 Ind. App. 281; Foreman v.
Foreman, 76 Ind. App. 83; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 67 Ind.
App. 230.
In the decision of Payne v. Payne (Ind.) 169 N.E.
475, a case decided one day before the main case reviewed
here the Supreme Court held that the requirement as to
affidavit of residence in divorce proceedings cannot be
waived by the parties, citing as authority, Foreman v. Foreman, 76 Ind. App. 83; Willis v. Willis, 176 Ind. 631; and
Smith v. Smith, 185 Ind. 75.
Indiana appears to be the only state that requires an
affidavit to be filed with the complaint, but most states have
by statute required that residence in the state be directly
and unequivocally alleged in it, as residence in these states
is a jurisdictional fact. Further, it is advisable in alleging
residence to follow the language of the statute.
KENNETH KONOP.
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LOTTERIES-State of Wisconsin v. Thomas Peterson. (Not yet reported).
The State of. Wisconsin filed complaint in the circuit
court for Dane county. The purpose of suit was the recovery of $750.00 which defendant had received from the sale
of an automobile he won at a lottery. The state alleged that
under the Wisconsin statutes the winnings at any lottery
are forfeited to the state. It claimed that it could recover
the proceeds of the sale of such a forfeited article. Defendant demurred to the complaint and the circuit court held
that no cause was stated for only the property won at the
lottery was forfeited. The state appealed to the Supreme
Court. That court held that the policy of Wisconsin as expressly stated in the statutes is clearly against lotteries. Section 348.06 provides that "all sums of money or other valuable thing drawn or received by any person as a prize or
share or part of a prize derived by or through any lottery or
pretended lottery, contrary to the provisions of the preceding sections of this chapter shall be forfeited to this state
and may be recovered by any proper action brought by the
attorney general or any district attorney in the name and
behalf of the state." The court said that under the statutes
the defendant never had any title to the automobile, but it
vested in the state. The forfeiture acted 'as a statutory
transfer of title to the state at the time the offense was committed.- (Here citing United States .v. Stowell, 133 U. S.
16, 17, and referring to United States b. Grundy, 3 Cranch

337, McConathy v. Deck, 83 Pac. 135, and Note in 7 A.
& E. Annotated Cases 899). Defendant in selling the state's
property became indebted to the state for at least the sale
price. The defendant's contention had been that the sole
remedy of the state was against the automobile won. Though
generally, in case of forfeitures, the recovery of the prize is
sought the court said this is not the only remedy. The act,
in requiring suit by the state to recover the winning, means
to provide a hearing on the issue of whether or not the defendant won the property at a lottery, a condition to'title
resting in the state. The statute, being penal, should be
strictly construed, but should also be interpreted to carry
out the legislative intent. The court then declared that the
legislative intent was to wipe out lotteries and the encour-
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agelnent thereof. Also it was declared better that the state
recover of the guilty party the fruits of his guilt, here the
$750.00 than that action for the automobile be brought
against an innocent purchaser, leaving the guilty party a
winner still. Further it was stated that the action is not in
rem proceeding, but one against the offender. The cause
was remanded to the circuit court with instructions to overrule the demurrer to the state's complaint.
WILLIAM H. KoNoP.
AUTOMOBILE S.-The right of way conferred on
a driver of a- approachingautomobile from the right is not
absolute. McHUlm
V. MASON, 283 P. 184.
Auburn Avenue approaches Main Street from a northeasterly angle. The appellant while riding in a car on
Auburn Avenue was struck at the intersection, by the car
of the appellee who was approaching on his left on Main
Street.
The trial court found that the appellee was negligent,
but that the driver of the car in which the appellant was riding was guilty of contributory negligence in not having
looked for, and giving the right of way to, the car of the
appellee.
According to the facts, it was found that the car- of the
appellant had just started and was. traveling at a rate of
14 miles an hour, while the car of the appellee was traveling
at an excessively high rate of speed. The driver of- the appellant's car had looked out and seen no approaching traffic
before he attempted to cross the intersection.
The Supreme Court found that:
"Such a right of way, as is conferred-by statute is not
an absolute right, but is a relative right only. (Wash.)
Breithaupt v. Martin. 279 P. 568.
There must be some reasonable limitations on the right
of way enjoyed by a machine approaching from the right.
Saad v. Langworthy. 280 P. 568."
It was further found that the appellant had the right
to assume that the appellee would not travel at a speed above
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that alloied by law, unless he had actual notice that he was
traveling at such a speed.
The fact that the appellee was not given the right of
way is not conclusive that the driver of the appellant's car
was guilty of contributory negligence. Such a question
should have been left for the jury. The appellant's motion
for a new trial is granted.
This decision overthrows a popular fallacy, that the
right of way conferred upon the driver of a car is absolute.
It might be best summed up as follows:
"The right of an automobile driver who has the right
of way is not exclusive, but is relative and subject to the
doctrine that the right must be so used as not to injure
others." Foley v. Taylor, 209 P. 698.
Research has found that a number of states have preceded Washington in the rule; as may be attested by: Jones
v. Cook, 96 W. Va. 60; Paulsen v. Klinge, 92 N. J. L. 99;
Grant v. Marshall, 121 A. 664; Glatz v. Kroger, 168
A. J. B.ARLow.
Wis 635.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.-The rule that
neither tenant nor his invitee may recover against landlord
for injuries caused by defects is inapplicable to portions of
premises over which landlord retains control."
The defendant owns several tenements and the sole
means of approach is a passageway, which is reached from
the street by a flight of stone steps. The plaintiff endeavored to show by evidence that one of the steps had been
in a loose condition for a year and that the defendant had
been warned of such defect, but had negligently permitted
it to remain in a dangerous state, so that the plaintiff in
using the passage way was severely injured when he attempted to ascend the steps and the top one being loose
when he stepped on it "threw" him, thereby causing the
injury complained of.
The tenant takes the premises as he finds them and
that in the absence of warranty or deceit, neither the tenant
nor his invitee may recover against the landlord for injuries
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sustained by reasons of defects therein. Town vs. Thompson,
68 N. H. 317, Clarke v. Stayle, 76 N. H. 446, Marston v.
Andler, 80 N. H. 564.
However, such a principle does not apply to those portions of the premises which the landlord furnishes for the
common use of his tenants and over which he retains control. Gobrecht v. Beckwith, 82 N. H. 415, Soad v. Papageorge, 82 N. H. 294.
It is prevalent in the cases I have enumerated that the
landlord has the duty to use ordinary care to keep such portions in safe condition, and is liable to the invitee of a tenant
rightfully using the premises. Gleason v. Boehm, 58 N. J.
Law 475, I. Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant, 189.
The landlord's duty under the exception to the rule is
not limited to interior passageways, but extends also to approaches thereto which he has provided upon his land for
like common use of tenants and of which he retains control.
2 Underhill, Landlord and Tenant 485, 25 A.L.R. 1285.
J. H. TUBERTY.

AUTOMOBILES-Key No. 164. Driver on rainy
day owes duty to prospective street car passengers to have
car under control to safely pass them. Reported in 124
Southern 780.
Murphy, the plaintiff, was standing on Florida Street
in the city of Baton Rouge, at its intersection with Thirteenth Street, on the north side of the street car tracks on
said street. There was space enough between the curbing
on the north side of the street and the place where the plaintiff was standing, for the defendant's driver to have driven
an automobile past the plaintiff without injuring him. It is
clear that the plaintiff was standing out in open view of the
defendant's driver, who was going east on Florida Street.
An approaching street car was also in plain -view of the
defendant's driver, if he was looking in the direction he was
going. He also saw that the plaintiff was standing at the
place which was the ordinary car stop for the street car that
was coming and, as it was raining, he must have known that
the plaintiff was waiting there for the purpose of getting
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aboard the coming street car, which was close at hand.
Defendant's driver was driving too fast and it was impossible for him to get the car under control, and consequently
he struck the plaintiff, injuring him.
The court held that it was the duty of the defendant's
driver, approaching the plaintiff, with an unobstructed
view and with a rain falling, to commence in ample time
to get his automobile under control, so that he could either
pass between the plaintiff and the curbing on the north side
of the street without injuring him, if there was room to do
so in safety, and if the room was not sufficient, to stop and
not run over him. Murphy v. Gladney's, Inc. (Ct. of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit Dec. 3, 1929; 124 Southern 780.
The majority of the states have held in accord with the
principal case. 73 A. 1105 (Pa.); 161 N. Y. S. 472. 149 N.
W. 947 (Minn.); 110 A. 686 (Maine); 177 Ill. App. 530;
111 N. E. 447 (Ind.); 115 P. 1050 (Wash.); 68 Pa. Super.
Ct. 345; 234 P. 113 (Col.); 229 S. W. 836 (Mo.); 103A.
109 (Pa.); ll N. E. 457 (Ind.); 125 A. 82 (R. I.); 111
A. 625 (Conn.); 127 A. 500 (Md.); 124 N. B. 791
(Mass.); 124 P. 531 (Kan.); 119 N. W. 904 (Mich.);
110 A. 686 (Maine).
ALviN G. KOLSKI.
Witnesses-Defendant in civil action against whom
criminal proceedings was pending, asserting constitutional
right, couldn't be compelled to produce books: Louisiana
Strawberry Auction Co., Inc. v. Hendon. Supreme Court
of Louisiana, Nov. 4th, 1929. Reported in 124 So. 676.
The realtor was prosecuted as a criminal, and subsequently a civil suit was filed against him. In the civil action
application was made to the court for a subpoena duces
tecum, calling for the production, in court, of the defendant's books. In response to this motion, the realtor asserted
his constitutional right to refuse to give evidence against
himself, and therefore declined to produce his books, as long
as the criminal prosecution stood against him. The court
gave the accused a limited time to produce the books in court
under the penalty of the law. The realtor applied to this
court for writs of certiorari and prohibition. A temporary
writ of prohibition was granted.
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The court stated that under Article 475 of the Code
of Practice, which provides, "If in the course of the suit
either party discovers that his interest requires the intr6duction of titles and papers in the possession of the adverse
party, or of a third person, the court shall on application,
order the production of such books or papers; provided,
however, that in no case shall a person be compelled to produce papers that will subject him to a criminal prosecution
under the penal laws of the state," the realtor is entitled
to the relief applied for and it is therefore ordered that the
writ heretofore issued therein be perpetuated. Temporary
writ of prohibition perpetuated.
The great weight of authority seems to follow the above
holding. The following are some of the cases in accord. McGinnis v. State (1865) 24 Ind. 500; State v. Pence 89 N. E.
488, 173 Ind. 99; 311 Ill. 198 (1924) 142 N. E. 543; 200
U. S. 186; 21 Ky. Law Rep. 239, 51 S.W. 167; 94 Md.
375, 56 L.R.A. 322; 39 Texas Cr. R. 630, 47 S.W. 996.
"A corporation cannot resist upon the ground of the
constitutional protection against self-incrimination, the compulsory production of its books and papers before the grand
jury, under a subpoena duces tecum." Wilson v. U. S.
31 Sup. Ct. 538 (1911) 221 U. S. 361; 165 F. (N.Y.) 426;
218. Mo. 1, 116 S.W. 902.
A corporate officer cannot urge.his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination to excuse his refusal to produce the corporate records in his custody before the grand
jury under a subpoena duces tecum directed to him, because
their contents may tend to incriminate him. 221 U.S. 394;
59 Wash. 655 (1910), 110 Pac. 547.
FlA.wcis G.

FEDDER.

Ralph H. Simpson Co. vs. IndustrialCommission et al.
169 N.E. (Illinois) 225 Dec., 1929.
Providing under Workmen's Cqmpensation Act by
Louise Carr for the death of her husband, opposed by Ralph
I. Sampson Co., employer. The Industrial Commission
awarded Plt. $3,700 under Section 7, Paragraph 101, Smith
Hurd Rev. St. 1929, c48, Sec. 144. The Circuit Court of
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Cook County affirmed the Commissioner's judgment. The
case was brought to the Supreme Court on a writ of error
and was affirmed.
The facts show that Carr, while on the job strained
his back. Carr remained on the job for several weeks, but
his back continued to hurt. Carr then entered a hospital.
X-ray pictures were taken which showed a lymphatic sarcomia. Carr died a short time later as a result of the lymphatic sarcomia.
This case is of interest because it clarifies the law relating to compensation proceedings.
In compensation proceedings the burden is on claimant
to prove that accidental injury was sustained which arose
out of and in course of employment, and that death of the
employee was result of the injury. 329 Ill. 490, 160 N. E.
845; 326 Ill. 293, 157 N. E. 168.
The Supreme Court of Illinois pointed out that the
finding of an Industrial Commission will not be disturbed
by the Supreme Court, unless it is contrary to the manifest
weight of evidence. 323 Ill. 80, 153 N. E. 699.
If the death is fairly chargeable to an accident suffered
in the course of claimant's employment as an efficient cause,
compensation may be awarded although the cause of death
existed prior to accident, provided death was accelerated
by the injury, but there must be a direct relationship between the accident and the subsequent death. 303 Ill. 455,
135 N.E. 789; 303 Ill. 410, 135 N.E. 754; 302 Id. 610, 135
N.E. 98; 301 Id. 418, 134 N.E. 174.
Under Workmen's Compensation Act the employer
must have notice of accident within thirty days. Actual notice is sufficient. Thus in the case of Omaaha Boarding and
Supply Co. vs. Industrial Commission 306 Ill. 384, 138
N.E. 106, it was held that, where the president of the ,employer corporation visited the employee after the injury and
before he returned to work and was present when the employee was examined by the doctor, proof of such facts
showed employer had notice of the accident. In Valier vs.
Industrial Commission (300 Ill. 69, 150 N.E. 651) it was

294
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held that, when the manager of a mine was told by employee's son that the employee was injured and could not
work, the employer had sufficient notice that a claim for
compensation, might be made. 247 11 498, 113 N.E. 976;
291 Id. 579, 126 N.E. 564; 291 Id. 616, 126 N.E. 616.
WILLIAM LEE O'UMALLEY.

